<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Reachability on Omanshu Thapliyal</title><link>https://omanshuthapliyal.github.io/tags/reachability/</link><description>Recent content in Reachability on Omanshu Thapliyal</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><atom:link href="https://omanshuthapliyal.github.io/tags/reachability/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Provable Safety and Efficient Memory for Language Models</title><link>https://omanshuthapliyal.github.io/projects/provable-safety-and-efficient-memory-for-language-models/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://omanshuthapliyal.github.io/projects/provable-safety-and-efficient-memory-for-language-models/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="problem">Problem&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Putting language models into safety-critical operations raises questions that
accuracy benchmarks do not answer. If a safety filter says a prompt is safe,
will it still say so when the prompt is changed slightly? When a model is
adapted to a new task, what has the added component learned to remember, and
can that be bounded?&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Both are questions about dynamics. State space models (SSMs), the recurrent
architecture behind Mamba and S4, are dynamical systems, so the tools used to
certify controllers apply to them directly: reachability, contraction and
model reduction. This project uses those tools to build language-model
components whose behavior can be checked, not just measured.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Safety and Cybersecurity of Cyberphysical Systems</title><link>https://omanshuthapliyal.github.io/projects/safety-and-cybersecurity-of-cyberphysical-systems/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://omanshuthapliyal.github.io/projects/safety-and-cybersecurity-of-cyberphysical-systems/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="problem">Problem&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Drones, air taxis and robot teams are cyberphysical systems: physical machines
run by software and linked by networks. Before they can be trusted in
safety-critical airspace, we need to know every state they could reach, and
whether any of those states is unsafe. The exact answer comes from solving
high-dimensional partial differential equations, which is out of reach once a
system is nonlinear, learned from data by a neural network, spread across many
agents, or under cyberattack.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Safe Autonomous Operations</title><link>https://omanshuthapliyal.github.io/projects/unmanned-aerial-vehicle-safe-autonomous-operations/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://omanshuthapliyal.github.io/projects/unmanned-aerial-vehicle-safe-autonomous-operations/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="problem">Problem&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Air taxis and delivery drones are expected to fly autonomously over cities,
but public trust is low: in one survey cited in this work, only 26% of
respondents trusted autonomous air taxis. Before these vehicles can fly on
their own, their controllers need a clear safety guarantee: the set of states
from which the vehicle can still avoid a collision or reach its landing pad.
Computing that set means solving a Hamilton-Jacobi equation, and grid-based
solvers become impractical for realistic vehicle models with 6 to 12 states.
Learning-based controllers scale better, but they are hard to certify.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>